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We use differences between the attributes of stock issuers and repurchasers to forecast characteristic-related
stock returns. For example, we show that large firms underperform following years when issuing firms
are large relative to repurchasing firms. Our approach is useful for forecasting returns to portfolios
based on book-to-market (HML), size (SMB), price, distress, payout policy, profitability, and industry.
We consider interpretations of these results based on both time-varying risk premia and mispricing.













shanson@hbs.eduI.  Introduction 
It is well known that firms that issue stock subsequently earn low returns on average. 
Loughran and Ritter (1995) find that firms issuing equity in either an IPO or a SEO 
underperform significantly post offering. Loughran and Vijh (1997) show that acquirers in stock-
financed mergers later underperform. Conversely, Ikenberry, Lakonishok and Vermaelen (1995) 
find that firms repurchasing shares have abnormally high returns. Fama and French (2008a) and 
Pontiff and Woodgate (2008) synthesize these results using a composite measure of net stock 
issuance: they show that the change in split-adjusted shares outstanding is a strong negative 
predictor of returns in the cross-section. 
A reasonable and widely accepted interpretation of these facts is that managers exploit 
private information about the firm’s future stock returns to minimize the total cost of financing. 
Where does this informational advantage come from? One view is that managers who know that 
their firm is overvalued issue shares to investors who in turn are overly optimistic about the 
firm’s future performance. As Loughran and Ritter (1995) put it, “firms take advantage of 
transitory windows of opportunity by issuing equity when, on average, they are substantially 
overvalued.” This interpretation receives support in Graham and Harvey’s (2001) survey of 
CFOs: 67 percent claim that the “the amount by which our stock is undervalued or overvalued by 
the market” influences whether the firm issues equity.  
In this paper, we put forth a complementary interpretation of these results: firms issue 
and repurchase shares to exploit time-varying characteristic mispricing. We show that firms issue 
prior to periods in which their characteristics perform poorly, and repurchase prior to periods 
when their characteristics perform well. Our empirical design relies on two assumptions. First, 
firm characteristics – such as the book-to-market ratio, sales growth, dividend policy, or industry 




considerable support in the vast empirical literature on stock returns (e.g., Daniel and Titman 
1997). Second, characteristic-based expected returns may vary over time. Variation in expected 
characteristic returns may be driven by time-varying risk premia, or they may be driven by 
characteristic-level mispricing. In the latter case, we might interpret characteristic-level 
mispricing as stemming from time-varying investor enthusiasm for different themes. Together, 
these assumptions amount to saying that stock returns can be described by a conditional 
characteristics model.  
How should firms respond to predictable variation in characteristic returns? If this 
variation reflects mispricing, firms endowed with a characteristic with low expected returns can 
exploit this by selling shares or undertaking stock-financed acquisitions. This activity advantages 
firms’ existing long-term shareholders at the expense of short-term investors who buy shares 
which subsequently underperform. Likewise, firms endowed with a characteristic with high 
expected returns may decide to repurchase existing shares. Why do firms undertake trades of this 
sort? Relative to professional arbitrageurs, firms may be advantaged when mispricing converges 
slowly or is associated with undiversifiable risk (e.g., Shleifer and Vishny 1997; Stein 2005). 
Following the logic above, differences between the attributes of recent issuers and 
repurchasers can be used to forecast characteristic-level returns. So, for example, if we were to 
observe that recent issuers were predominately firms with characteristic X, we might reasonably 
infer that returns of firms with characteristic X would subsequently be low. As we discuss below, 
the characteristics of recent issuers might be useful for forecasting characteristic returns even if 
this is driven solely by rational variation in risk premia.  
Our empirical strategy closely follows the above intuition. Focusing on firm attributes 
identified by previous work, we use differences between the characteristics of recent issuers and 




portfolios associated with these characteristics. Specifically, following periods in which issuing 
firms have particularly high values of a characteristic compared to repurchasing firms, we would 
expect the long-short portfolio associated with that characteristic to perform poorly. Which firm 
attributes? Although in principle our approach could be applied to any characteristic, we limit 
ourselves to traits which have appeared in previous work and, more importantly, can be 
measured reliably in the data since the 1960s: book-to-market, sales growth, accruals, size, 
nominal share price, age, beta, volatility, distress (bankruptcy hazard rate), dividend policy, and 
profitability. In selecting these characteristics, we hope to capture some of the salient dimensions 
along which investors categorize stocks.
1  
In our baseline results, characteristic issuer-repurchaser spreads significantly forecast 
characteristics-based returns in six cases: book-to-market, size, nominal share price, distress, 
payout policy, profitability, and industry. For the remaining characteristics, the issuer-
repurchaser spread forecasts returns negatively, albeit with reduced statistical significance. Our 
measures help forecast factors associated with size (SMB) and book-to-market (HML). 
Arguably, book-to-market and size are two of the most important attributes that investors use to 
categorize stocks. Concretely, this means that when issuance is particularly tilted toward large 
(low B/M) stocks, SMB (HML) is expected to perform well in the subsequent year. In short, 
firms appear to be successful factor timers. 
One objection to the results described so far is that we may be picking up a time-varying 
loading on the net-issuance anomaly itself—and thus simply repackaging the known relationship 
between equity issuance and future stock returns. For instance, if one takes the 
                                                            
1 Among the characteristics listed above, book-to-market, size, nominal share price, dividend payout policy, and 
industry stand out as being most relevant from the perspective of investor categorization. For instance, there are 
mutual funds dedicated to stocks in each of these categories. For some of the other characteristics, such as 
profitability or sales growth, it is less clear that they form the basis of any particular investment style, yet some 
authors (e.g., Aghion and Stein (2008)) have argued that they may be salient at particular times. Barberis and 




underperformance of net-issuers as a primitive fact, then it might not be surprising to find that 
HML performs well when growth firms have recently issued stock, or likewise, when value firms 
have recently repurchased stock. This concern turns out to be easy to fix: similar to Loughran 
and Ritter (2000) we construct long-short characteristic portfolios that exclude the issuing and 
repurchasing firms. We achieve essentially similar results using these “issuer-purged” portfolios. 
In summary, net issuance forecasts the returns of non-issuing firms with similar characteristics. 
In a separate set of tests, we examine industry-related characteristics and find that the issuance 
and repurchase decisions of firms in a given industry forecast the returns to non-issuers in the 
same industry. 
An important question is whether our results are consistent with market efficiency. We 
consider two potential explanations. The first is that, because equity issues have the effect of 
delevering the firm’s assets, the required returns on equity falls mechanically post issuance 
through a Modigliani and Miller (1958) channel. A variation of this explanation is that issuance 
causes lower returns because firms convert growth options into assets in place when they decide 
to invest (Carlson, Fisher, Giammarino 2004). Because growth options are riskier than installed 
assets, required returns fall post-issuance. These explanations are unable to account for our 
results because issuer-repurchaser spreads forecast characteristic returns for firms that do not 
issue or repurchase.  
A second potential explanation is that issuance is a noisy proxy for investment which 
responds to time variation in rationally required returns. Specifically, when rationally required 
returns decline, firms will invest more and some of this investment will be financed with 
additional equity. Under this explanation, issuer-repurchaser spreads forecast characteristic 
returns because a higher value of the characteristic among issuing firms is associated with lower 




and low levels of investment should be a better forecaster of returns than the issuer-repurchaser 
spread. In univariate regressions these investment-based measures have some modest ability to 
predict characteristic-level returns. However, in horse races with our issuer-repurchaser spreads, 
the issuer-repurchaser spreads generally remain significant while the investment-based measures 
often enter with the wrong sign and are rarely statistically insignificant.  
In summary, the evidence is primarily consistent with the view that issuance and 
repurchase activity is partly an attempt to exploit time-varying characteristic mispricing, 
suggesting that firms may play a role as arbitrageurs in the capital market. We stress, however, 
that our forecasting results are useful even if they are consistent with some forms of market 
efficiency, since they help us forecast time-series variation in returns at the characteristic level. 
For instance, other than Cohen, Polk, and Vuolteenaho (2003), we know of no other paper that 
has had much empirical success forecasting HML or SMB. 
Given these results, we ask what fraction of the underperformance of recent issuers can 
be explained by characteristic timing. If firms only respond weakly to time-varying expected 
characteristic returns, characteristic timing might be relatively unimportant from a corporate 
finance standpoint, although still useful for forecasting returns. Our estimates suggest that at 
least one fifth of the underperformance of recent issuers is due to characteristic timing. 
The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, we lay out an empirical model of 
characteristic timing. Section III describes the construction of our characteristic issuer-
repurchaser spread measures. In Section IV, we use issuer-repurchaser spreads to forecast 
returns. Section V considers whether the results are consistent with market efficiency, or whether 
they are better explained by the view that firms time their issuance to exploit mispriced 
characteristics. Section VI evaluates the economic importance of characteristic timing from the 





II.  Empirical strategy 
We develop a framework to motivate our empirical strategy, which uses patterns in 
corporate issuance to identify time-variation in characteristic expected returns. We assume that 
expected returns are given by a conditional characteristics model: 
1 , 1 1 ,1 2 1 ,1 ,1 () ti t t i t t i t i t ER X T X                 (1) 
where Xi,t-1 denotes firm i’s characteristic and Tt-1 reflects time-series variation in the conditional 
expected return associated with that characteristic. We emphasize that at this point it makes no 
difference if we interpret time-series variation in expected characteristic returns as reflecting 
mispricing (in which case they are deviations from rationally required returns) or if (1) describes 
investors’ required returns. In the first case, equation (1) can be seen as a stylized representation 
of the idea that investor sentiment is associated with different themes during different periods. 
Themes attach themselves to attributes, such as “internet,” “profitable,” “large stocks,” or “high 
dividend yield” but we recognize that the mapping between these themes and the characteristics 
we measure in the data is inherently imperfect. Baker and Wurgler (2006) use a similar empirical 
specification to study the role of time-varying investor sentiment. Equation (1) can also be 
interpreted within the context of rationally time-varying risk premia: in this case, we assume that 
characteristic X is related to the firm’s loading on some risk factor whose price of risk (T) varies 
over time.  
To keep matters simple, we write equation (1) as a function of a single characteristic. 
Without loss of generality, we also assume that E[Tt-1]=0, so that β1 represents the average cross-
sectional effect of Xi,t-1  (e.g., the average premium associated with size) and that Xi,t-1 and Tt-1 are 




mean zero and variance 
2
  . This term captures the idea that expected returns can only partially 
be explained by the characteristic under investigation.  
We assume that corporations issue stock when expected returns are low and repurchase 
when expected returns are high. Thus, net stock issuance (NS) is given by 
,1 1 , ,1 it t it it NS E R         (2) 
where i,t-1 is independently distributed across time and firms. We assume a unit elasticity of net 
issuance with respect to expected returns for simplicity only. Equation (2) can be seen as a 
reduced form representation of the idea that managers derive some benefit from issuing 
overpriced equity (and likewise, benefit from repurchasing underpriced equity).
2 Under this 
interpretation, the noise term  captures all factors other than market timing that may influence 
net stock issuance. For example, some firms might like to exploit mispricing, but can or do not 
for idiosyncratic reasons. The larger is the variance of , the smaller is the role of market timing 
in explaining net stock issuance.
3 Equation (2) can also be interpreted within a fully rational 
paradigm in which firms invest more and, hence, issue more equity when rationally required 
returns fall. In this case, the noise term  captures the fact that equity issuance is only a noisy 
signal of investment because it reflects a series of uninformative decisions about how that 
investment should be financed. In the Appendix, we present a short model in the spirit of Stein 
(1996) that motivates equation (2) and nests rational interpretations and interpretations based on 
                                                            
2As long as mispricing eventually reverts, such opportunistic issuance benefits long-term shareholders at the expense 
of short-term shareholders who buy the mispriced securities. Shleifer and Vishny (2003) and Baker, Ruback and 
Wurgler (2007) discuss this in more detail. 
3 For simplicity, equation (2) does not consider feedback effects of issuance on future returns. In Greenwood, 
Hanson, and Stein (2010), for example, firms issue more when expected returns are low, but in equilibrium, firms 
“fill the gap,” reducing predictability. Another assumption implicit in (2) is that firms respond with the same 




mispricing. Specifically, in this model, issuance is negatively related to both mispricing and to 
rational time-varying returns. 
Substituting (1) into (2), we have 
,1 1 1 ,1 2 1 ,1 ,1 ,1 [( ) ] . it t it t it it it NS X T X                    (3) 
Equation (3) says that issuance will respond to market-wide, characteristic-specific, and firm-
specific expected returns. We now consider a univariate cross-sectional regression of issuance in 
period t-1 on characteristics Xi,t-1:  ,1 1 1 .1 ,1 it t t it it NS X          . The slope coefficient from this 
regression is  
11 2 1 () tt T       ,   (4) 
which is the conditional expected return associated with Xi,t-1. Assuming that β1 and β2 are fixed, 
the time series of cross-sectional regression coefficients δt-1 will reveal time variation in 
characteristic expected returns Tt-1. The intuition here is straightforward: while the relationship 
between expected returns and individual firm issuance and repurchase decisions will be noisy, 
the full cross-section of net stock issuance contains information about characteristic-level 
expected returns.  
The benefit of this approach is best illustrated by example: suppose we are interested in 
forecasting Google’s return for the coming year. Following the literature on the cross-section of 
expected stock returns, we might assemble information on Google’s characteristics (e.g. book-to-
market, size, dividend yield, profitability, industry, etc.) and construct a forecast under the 
assumption that each characteristic is associated with some average return in the cross-section. 
However, the previous discussion suggests a refinement. We can use the net issuance of firms 
that have the same characteristics as Google to back-out Google’s expected return. Such 




A simple implementation of this idea is to compute differences between the 
characteristics of issuers (firms with high NSi,t-1) and repurchasers (firms with low NSi,t-1); the 
time-series of these differences should negatively forecast returns associated with that 
characteristic. We adopt this implementation in Section III. 
  A more formal implementation can be seen in a panel regression of stock returns on 
lagged values of the characteristic, lagged net issuance, and interactions of the lagged 
characteristic with our cross-section-based estimate of characteristic expected returns (Tt-1): 
, 1 ,1 2 1 ,1 ,1 , () it t it t it it it R ab X bT X c N S u          (5)
 
Does knowledge of Tt-1 help forecast stock returns beyond a firm’s own issuance? We have 
2









Thus,  β2 will be non-zero as long as 
2 0    : our estimates of time-varying characteristic 
expected returns will have incremental forecasting power so long as individual firm net issuance 
is a noisy signal of expected returns. 
 
III.  Issuer-repurchaser characteristic spreads 
The previous section suggests that if we measure the extent to which net issuers are 
disproportionately firms endowed with a characteristic, that this should provide information 
about the conditional expected returns of that characteristic. We do this for eleven 
characteristics, as well as a set of industry-related attributes. 
 




Following Fama and French (2008a), we define net stock issuance (NS) as the change in 
log split-adjusted shares outstanding from Compustat (CSHO x AJEX). 
In December of year t-1, we divide all firms into New lists, Issuers, Repurchasers, and 
Others (i.e., non-issuers) based on share issuance in year t-1. New lists are firms that listed 
during year t-1 (these firms have Age less than one in December of year t-1). Since many of the 
characteristics we study cannot be defined for new lists, we discard these firms in our baseline 
measures. The remaining seasoned firms are divided into three categories: Issuers have NS 
greater than 10%. Repurchasers have NS less than -0.5%, and Others have NS between -0.5% 
and 10%. Since we are using a composite net issuance measure, issuers include firms completing 
SEOs, stock-financed mergers, and other corporate events that significantly increase shares 
outstanding (e.g. large executive compensation schemes). Figure 1 illustrates the breakdown of 
NS into these three groups by showing the histogram of net issuance of public firms in 1984. 
Table 2 summarizes the breakdown by year. Between 1962 and 2006, an average 6.6% of firms 
were new lists, 12.4% were issuers, and 13.5% were repurchasers.  
Table 2 also shows the average net issuance for firms in each group. Among issuers, 
average net issuance hovered near 20% during the 1960s and 1970s, trended upwards during the 
1980s, reaching a peak of 43.9% in 1993, and has declined somewhat since the early 1990s. 
Repurchasers have bought back between 3% and 7% of shares, on average, since the early 
1970s; however, there has been a modest trend toward smaller repurchases in recent years. Due 
to growth in executive compensation, the average value of NS among non-issuers has risen 
slightly from 1.1% in 1973 to 2.0% in 2006 (Fama and French 2005).  
Our objective is to measure time-series variation in the composition of issuers and 




year t-1. We define the issuer-repurchaser spread for characteristic X as the average characteristic 
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where cross-sectional X-deciles for each year are based on NYSE breakpoints. For instance, if 
we consider size (ME), then  1 1
ME
t ISSREP   indicates that issuing firms were on average one size 
decile larger than repurchasing firms in year t-1. We define characteristic issuer-repurchaser 
spreads for book-to-market equity (B/M), sales growth (ΔS t/S t-1), accruals (Acc/A), size (ME), 
nominal share price (P), age, beta (), idiosyncratic volatility (), distress (SHUM) proxied 
using the Shumway (2001) bankruptcy hazard rate, dividend policy (Div), and profitability (E/B). 
These characteristics capture themes related to growth and growth opportunities (B/M, ΔS t/S t-1, 
Acc/A), size and/or safety (ME, P, Age, SHUM, Div), and profitability (E/B). The detailed 
construction of each characteristic is described in the Appendix. All characteristics except for 
dividend policy are measured using NYSE deciles; dividend policy is a dummy variable that 
takes a value of one if the firm paid a cash dividend in that year. We follow the Fama and French 
(1992) convention that accounting variables are measured in the fiscal year ending in year t-1 
and market-based variables are measured at the end of June of year t. 
Intuitively, the issuer-repurchaser spread captures the tilt of net issuance with respect to a 
given characteristic. A few alternate constructions could capture the same intuition. One obvious 
alternative would be to compare characteristics between new lists and existing firms. Underlying 




returns associated with its characteristics. Not surprisingly, spreads based on the characteristics 
of new lists are correlated with measures we compute in (7).
4  
Although we examine a variety of characteristics, a priori one might expect our approach 
to work better for some characteristics than for others. One issue is that in order for ISSREP
X to 
forecast returns associated with characteristic X, any time variation in expected returns must be 
sufficiently persistent for corporate managers to be able to act on it in a reasonable time-frame. 
For instance, under the characteristic mispricing interpretation, there may be a delay between the 
recognition of mispricing and managers’ ability to issue more equity. Thus, we would be 
surprised to find firms timing their issuance and repurchase decisions to exploit short-lived 
signals such as one-month reversal. By contrast, we would be less surprised to find firms 
responding to changes in expected returns of more persistent characteristics such as B/M, size, or 
industry.  
When using the issuer-repurchaser spreads to forecast returns, we primarily focus on the 
1972-2006 period, thus forecasting returns for 1973-2007, although we always show results for 
the full 1963-2007 period as well. Our focus on the later data is for two reasons. First, we worry 
that characteristic spreads are contaminated by changes in the CRSP universe due to the 
introduction of NASDAQ data in December 1972. Second, Pontiff and Woodgate (2008) and 
Fama and French (2008b) find that net share issuance does not predict returns prior to 1970 and 
1963, respectively. Bagwell and Shoven (1989) point out that repurchases surged after 1982. 
Fama and French (2005) argue that share issuance has become far more widespread post-1972, 
while Fama-French (2008c) show that net issuance was more responsive to valuations (B/M) in 
their 1983-2006 sub-sample than from 1963-1982.  
                                                            
4 We achieve many of the same results if we instead define a “new list minus repurchaser” spread constructed 
analogously to our main predictor. However, for several of the characteristics we consider, the new list characteristic 




B.  Discussion 
Figure 2 plots and Table 1 summarizes issuer-repurchaser spreads for each of the eleven 
characteristics. Panel A of Table 3 lists the average cross-sectional correlations between our 
eleven characteristics (in decile form) and Panel B of Table 3 summarizes the time-series 
correlations between the eleven issuer-repurchaser spreads. 
From Table 1, the average value of the issuer-repurchaser spread for book-to-market is -
1.78 deciles and is always negative, as issuers are disproportionately growth firms throughout the 
sample. More importantly for our purposes, Panel A of Figure 2 shows that the issuer-
repurchaser spread for book-to-market exhibits significant time-series variation. The spread 
starts out low during the “tronics” fad of 1962 and is low again during the boom of 1967-1968. 
The spread is high during the bear market of the early to mid-1970s, but declines during the late 
1970s and the IPO boom of the early 1980s. The spread begins to rise in 1983 and remains high 
throughout the remainder of the 1980s. It then drops sharply during the technology bubble in 
1999, before rising significantly afterwards. 
The issuer-repurchaser spread for sales growth is always positive, indicating that issuers 
have higher sales growth than repurchasers on average. Panel B of Figure 2 suggests that 
issuance was particularly tilted toward firms with high sales growth during the late 1960s and 
early 1970s, the early 1980s, and again in the late 1990s. The issuer-repurchaser spread for 
accruals is typically positive and is highly correlated with the issuer-repurchaser spread for sales 
growth ( = 0.72). 
As shown in Panel B of Table 3, the issuer-repurchaser spreads for size, price, age, beta, 
idiosyncratic volatility, and dividend policy are all strongly correlated, with pairwise correlations 




The issuer-repurchaser spread for size is close to zero on average. That is, there has been 
little unconditional size tilt in stock issuance. However, there is significant time-series variation. 
As shown in Panel D of Figure 2, issuance was tilted toward small firms in the late 1960s and 
toward large firms during the “nifty-fifty” period of the early 1970s when large firms were 
popular with investors. The spread appears slightly countercyclical, increasing modestly during 
each of the recessions in our sample with the exception of the 1980-1982 recession. 
Greene and Hwang (2008) suggest that investors classify stocks based on their nominal 
share price. Panel E shows that the issuer-repurchaser spread for share price closely tracks the 
spread for size. Benartzi, Michaely, Thaler and Weld (2007) point out that size and price are 
strongly correlated in the cross-section. 
As shown in Panel F of Figure 2, the issuer-repurchaser spread for age also tracks the 
spread for size, particularly during the first half of the sample. Consistent with Loughran and 
Ritter (2004), who find little change in the age of IPO firms from 1980-1998, the age spread has 
been relatively constant since the early 1980s. However, there is a small shift toward older 
issuers after the collapse of technology stocks in 2000. 
The issuer-repurchaser spreads for beta and volatility are highly correlated in the time-
series ( = 0.68).  While the issuer repurchaser spread for beta is usually positive, Panel G 
shows that issuance was particularly tilted towards high beta firms during the late 1960s, early 
1980s, and late 1990s. The issuer-repurchaser spread for volatility is always positive and has 
trended steadily upwards since the late 1970s.  
The issuer-repurchaser spread for distress in part reflects the previous results for size and 
volatility. Our distress measure is the bankruptcy hazard rate estimated by Shumway (2001) and 
reflects a linear combination of size, volatility, past returns, profitability, and leverage. As shown 




was tilted towards firms with high bankruptcy risk during the late 1960s and early 1970s, with 
the pattern reversing in the mid-1970s. Not surprisingly, there is some tendency for the issuer-
repurchaser spread for distress to decline during recessions. 
The issuer-repurchaser spread for dividend policy is highly correlated with the spreads 
for size and age. This series is also 50% correlated with the Baker and Wurgler (2004) dividend 
premium (untabulated). This is not surprising given the cross-sectional correlation between net 
issuance and market-to-book ratios. 
Last, consistent with the findings in Fama and French (2004), Panel K of Figure 2 shows 
that there is a steady downward trend in the profitability of issuers relative to repurchasers.  
 
IV.  Results 
In this section, we use issuer-repurchaser spreads to forecast characteristic returns. We 
also consider an adjustment to our baseline methodology that allows us to consider industry-
related characteristics.  
A.  Long-short portfolio forecasting regressions 
Our main prediction is that the long-short portfolio for a given characteristic will 
underperform following periods when the issuer-repurchaser spread is high. Table 4 shows the 
results from our baseline forecasting regression: 
1
XX
tt t Ra b I S S R E Pu     (8) 
where R
X denotes the return on a portfolio that buys firms with high values of characteristic X 
and sells short firms with low values of X. The construction of these portfolios follows the Fama 
and French (1993) procedure for constructing HML.
5 For example, if the characteristic in 
                                                            
5 Firms are independently sorted into Low, Neutral, or High groups of characteristic X using 30% and 70% NYSE 




question is B/M, then R
X is simply the return on the Fama and French HML portfolio. For the 
size (ME) characteristic, R
X is negative one times SMB. We follow the usual timing convention 
that issuer-repurchase spreads for fiscal-years ending in calendar year t-1 are matched to monthly 
returns between July of year t and June of year t+1. In these monthly regressions, the ISSREP
X 
predictor is measured annually, so standard errors are clustered by portfolio formation year. 
Panel A of Table 4 shows the results of this univariate forecasting regression for the 
1963-2007 and 1973-2007 sample periods.  As can be seen in Panel A, our central prediction is 
confirmed for many, but not all, of the characteristics we consider. For example, using returns 
between 1963 and 2007, Table 4 shows that when issuers have high book-to-market relative to 
repurchasers, subsequent returns to HML are poor. Likewise, when issuers are particularly small 
relative to repurchasers, subsequent returns on SMB are low. Considering both the 1963-2007 
and 1973-2007 periods, our issuer-repurchaser spreads forecast the returns of all characteristic 
portfolios in the expected direction, with a single exception. In the later 1973-2007 sample, we 
obtain statistically significant results for book-to-market (B/M), size (ME), price (P), distress 
(SHUM), payout policy (Div), and profitability (E/B). In untabulated tests, we find that the 
eleven issuer-repurchaser spreads are jointly significant forecasters of characteristic returns at 
greater than the one percent level.
6 However, consistent with the previous discussion, we 
typically find the strongest predictability for characteristics that are more persistent at the firm 
level, such as B/M, size, price, and dividend policy. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
6 size-by-X buckets. The long-short return for characteristic X is defined as R
X = ½ (RBH - RBL) + ½ (RSH – RSL) 
where, for instance, RBH is the value-weighted return on big, high-X stocks. For size, we use R
ME = -SMB, while for 
dividend policy we use R
Div = (RPay - RNoPay) where, for instance, RPay is the value-weighted return on dividend-
paying stocks. 
 
6Specifically, we estimate a system of eleven forecasting regressions by OLS and perform an F-test that the 
coefficients on all the issuer-repurchaser spreads are jointly zero. This test takes into account the correlation of 





The predictability documented in Table 4 is economically significant. For example, the 
coefficient -0.713 in the first row and column of the table implies that when the issuer-
repurchaser spread for B/M rises by one decile, HML returns fall by 71 bps per month in the 
following year. Thus, a one standard deviation increase in 
/ BM ISSREP  of 0.58 is associated with 
a 41 bps decline in monthly HML returns. One may wish to compare these effects to the mean 
and standard deviation of characteristic portfolio returns shown in Panel C of Table 1. As can be 
seen, 41 bps is large relative to the average monthly HML return of 44 bps and its monthly 
standard deviation of 295 bps. Similar calculations show that the estimates in Table 4 imply 
economically meaningful predictability for size (ME), price (P), , distress (SHUM), dividend 
policy (Div), and profitability (E/B). 
In Panel B, we add controls for contemporaneous (monthly) realizations of market excess 
returns, HML, SMB, and UMD, thus we effectively use 
X ISSREP  to forecast the 4-factor of 
the long-short characteristic portfolios. (We do not include HML as a control in the regressions 
for B/M because the dependent variable is HML. Similarly, we do not include SMB as a control 
in the ME regression because the dependent variable is minus SMB.) While these results are 
generally similar to those from the univariate specifications in Panel A, there are some minor 
differences. For instance, in the 1973-2007 sample period the result for profitability (E/B) is no 
longer significant once we add the 4-factor controls; however, the result for  is now borderline 
significant (t = -1.80). 
Despite the fact that many of our characteristic-based spreads survive the additional 
controls, conceptually we still prefer the univariate specifications. For many of our 
characteristics, returns might be correlated with temporary fluctuations in the expected returns 




removing economically interesting variation. For example, our ability to forecast returns 
associated with price (P) is diminished once we control for contemporaneous realizations of 
SMB. Since size and price are tightly linked in both the cross-section and over time, this 
essentially tells us that the univariate forecasts for price reflect a similar pattern to the 
predictability we have documented for size (ME). Notwithstanding these stringent controls, the 
ability to forecast the returns of some characteristic-based portfolios remains. In the last column 
in Table 4, for example, characteristic spreads for β, distress (SHUM), and dividend policy (Div) 
prove to be somewhat useful for forecasting returns, despite the tight link between these 
characteristics and both size and B/M in both the cross-section and over time.   
 
B.  Issuance purged forecasting regressions 
One concern with the results presented so far is that we might simply be restating the net 
issuance anomaly in characteristic space. This would work as follows. Suppose we take the 
negative relationship between net stock issues (NS) and future returns as a primitive fact. 
Consider a year where the issuer-repurchaser spread for characteristic X is high. The long-side of 
the high-X minus low-X portfolio in that year is likely to contain a higher than usual number of 
issuers and, to the extent that NS  and  X each contain independent information about future 
returns, we would expect below average returns to the portfolio in that year. Thus, instead of 
time-varying characteristic expected returns, our results could reflect a time-varying loading on 
the net-issuance anomaly. 
Following the approach in Loughran and Ritter (2000), we can address this concern by 
forecasting the returns to “issuer-purged” characteristic portfolios computed using only the set of 
non-issuing firms. Specifically, while ISSREP
X is calculated as before, the characteristic returns 




sectional breakpoints used when computing the issuer-purged factors are the same as those used 
for the standard or un-purged factors.  
Table 5 shows these results. As expected, the results are weaker for several 
characteristics, suggesting that our initial findings in Table 4 may be partially picking up the 
direct effect of issuance. However, in the 1973-2007 period, the correlation between the issuer-
repurchaser spread and subsequent returns remains negative in nine out of eleven cases, and 
significant or marginally significant in five cases: book-to-market, size, price, distress, and 
payout policy. In summary, the issuance and repurchase decisions of firms contain information 
which can be used to forecast returns of non-issuers with similar characteristics.  
C.  Industry characteristics  
We have not yet considered industry-based returns, yet industry is undoubtedly a salient 
firm characteristic. Industry membership is inherently categorical rather than continuous, and 
thus does not map neatly into our baseline methodology which requires us to assign high or low 
values of a characteristic to each stock (e.g., there is no sense in which a stock is a “low” or a 
“high” retailer).  
We adapt our approach to study the expected returns associated with industry 
characteristics and estimate pooled monthly forecasting regressions of the form 
  ,, 1 , 1 , 1 , 1 , 1 , j t t jt jt jt jt jt jt R ab N S c B M d M E e M O M f u               .  (9) 
In equation (11), Rj,t is the value-weighted return to stocks in industry j. As in the previous 
section, industry returns are “issuer-purged”: we use only the subset of seasoned firms that did 
not issue or repurchase stock in the prior fiscal year. The lagged independent variables include 
the value-weighted averages of NS and BM  for stocks in that industry, the log market 




t-13 and t-2 (MOM), and the industry’s market beta (β). Our baseline specifications are estimated 
with month fixed effects (at), so the identification is from cross-industry differences in net 
issuance.
7 We also present specifications that add industry fixed-effects. Standard errors are 
clustered by month to account for the cross-sectional correlation of industry residuals. 
To estimate (11), we require an appropriate definition of industry. We follow the 
common practice in academic studies of using the 48 industries identified by Fama and French 
(1997).
8 Many of these industry definitions correspond to those investors use to classify stocks. 
For example, there are mutual funds with mandates based on communications, utilities, 
petroleum and natural gas, all of which occupy distinct industries under the Fama and French 
classification scheme.  
The results of estimating equation (9) are shown in Table 6.  The table shows that the 
issuance and repurchase decisions of firms in a given industry forecast the returns to non-issuers 
in the same industry. The estimate of -0.019 in the first column implies that if industry NS 
increases by one percentage point, the returns to non-issuers in the same industry decline by 1.9 
basis points per month during the following year. Alternately, a one standard deviation increase 
in industry NS of 5.44% lowers industry returns by 11 bps per month or 1.33% per year. In Panel 
B we estimate equation (11) replacing the right-hand-side variables with their industry ranks (i.e. 
1 through 48). This yields even stronger evidence that industry net issuance is negatively related 
to future returns. 
                                                            
7 We obtain similar results using the Fama-MacBeth (1973) procedure, albeit with slightly diminished significance. 
The pooled estimator with time fixed-effects is a weighted average of the coefficients from monthly cross-sectional 
regressions. However, the panel estimator efficiently weights these cross-sections (e.g. periods with greater cross-
industry variance in NS receive more weight), whereas Fama-MacBeth assigns equal weights to all periods. 
 
8 Chan, Lakonishok and Swaminathan (2007) compare the Fama and French (1997) classifications to GICS-based 
classifications commonly used by practitioners. Although they find that GICS-based classifications are slightly 
better, the Fama and French (1997) classifications perform reasonably. Our sense is that the Fama and French 
classifications may be too fine to capture the broad patterns of industry-level sentiment that might be expected under 




D.  Robustness issues in time-series regressions  
Below we describe the results of a number of robustness tests. To save space, we describe 
the results here and tabulate the results in the Internet Appendix.
9 
The first set of concerns relates to measurement of issuer-repurchaser spreads. We obtain 
broadly similar results if (1) net issuance is derived from CRSP data as in Pontiff and Woodgate 
(2008); (2) issuer-repurchaser spreads are redefined as the difference in raw characteristics 
between issuers and repurchasers (in contrast with characteristic deciles); (3) we use different 
cut-offs for partitioning issuers, repurchasers, and non-issuers; (4) we use a “characteristic net 
issuance spread” defined as the difference in average NS (or NS decile) between firms with high 
and low values of X; and (5) we use the coefficient from a cross-sectional regression of NS (or 
NS decile) on characteristic X (or X decile).  
A second set of concerns relates to measurement of returns themselves: We obtain similar 
results if we instead use the returns to portfolios that are long (short) stocks in decile ten (one) of 
characteristic X (in contrast to the size-balanced long-short portfolios that we use as a baseline). 
We also obtain similar results with equal weighted portfolios. 
A third set of concerns relates to potential controls in our forecasting regressions. Our 
portfolio-level tests already include contemporaneous HML, SMB, UMD, and the market excess 
return.  Our results are robust to controlling for lagged characteristic returns. Thus, the 
predictability we identify is distinct from the style-level reversal and momentum documented in 
Teo and Woo (2004). Our results are also robust to controlling for the “characteristic value 
spread” defined as the difference between the average book-to-market of high X and low X 
stocks. While value spreads help to forecast characteristic returns, these tests show that ISSREP
X 
                                                            





contains information over and above that contained in book-to-market ratios. Adding a time 
trend to the controls strengthens the results for several characteristics by eliminating a secular 
trend in our measure (e.g., in β and σ). However, the result for profitability, which trends 
strongly over time, is weakened by the inclusion of this trend. Finally, since we previously noted 
a small cyclical component to some of the ISSREP
X series, we estimate specifications in which 
we include a simple recession dummy as a control. The results are qualitatively unchanged by 
this addition. 
A fourth set of concerns relates to the composition of firms that respond to variation in 
expected characteristic returns. For instance, Fama and French (2008c) suggest that opportunistic 
financing has increased markedly for small firms since 1982. Reassuringly, we obtain similar 
results if issuer-repurchaser spreads are based on the value-weighted averages of characteristic 
deciles among issuers and repurchasers as opposed to equal the equal-weighted averages. A 
related question is whether the characteristic return predictability that we document is present 
mainly among small or large firms. We find that, while the effects are typically strongest for 
small firms, ISSREP
X has some forecasting power for long-short characteristic portfolios for both 
large and small stocks.  
Fifth, one may wonder whether our forecasting results are driven by the issuer side of the 
issuer-repurchaser spread, or by the repurchaser side. We can decompose the spread into these 
two pieces (issuers minus others and others minus repurchasers). Both issuance and repurchase 
activity contribute to the predictability shown in Table 4. 
A final set of concerns is related to “pseudo market timing” bias (Shultz (2003)). If 
issuers behave in a contrarian fashion so that issuer-repurchaser spreads increase when 
characteristic returns are high, one may worry that our results are driven by “aggregate pseudo 




by Baker, Taliaferro, and Wurgler (2006), this is simply a form of small-sample bias studied in 
Stambaugh (1999). The bias is most severe when the predictor variable is highly persistent and 
innovations to the predictor are correlated with return innovations. We compute bias-adjusted 
estimates of b and appropriate standard errors following Amihud and Hurvich (2004). It turns out 
that the bias is quite small for all characteristics since our issuer-repurchaser spreads are not too 
persistent and, more importantly, are not strongly related to past characteristic returns. 
 
E.  Panel Estimation 
Here we estimate panel specifications that follow directly from Section II. Specifically, 
we interact characteristics with estimates of time-varying characteristic expected returns to 
forecast firm-level returns in a panel regression. The panel technique should yield similar results 
to those shown in Tables 4 and 5, with the benefit that we can now directly control for a host of 
return predictors at the firm level. For example, we can control for the possibility that our 
forecasting results are simply picking up a book-to-market effect aggregated to the characteristic 
level (this would be the case if managers used the book-to-market ratio as the summary measure 
of overvaluation which told them whether to issue or repurchase stock). Thus, the regressions 
that follow serve as a further robustness check. 
Even ignoring the additional control variables, we might expect there to be some small 
differences with the results in Tables 4 and 5. For one, the panel estimation allows us to control 
for the direct effects of net issuance – rather than simply throwing out issuers and repurchasers 
altogether. In addition, because the panel weights all firms equally, it puts more weight on small 




We start by measuring time-series variation in the net issuance tilt with respect to each 
characteristic. For each characteristic X in each year t-1, we estimate a cross-sectional regression 
of net issuance on the characteristic decile: 
  ,1 1 1 ,1 ,1
X
it t t it it NS X         (10) 
This procedure yields a series of 45 estimates (between 1962 and 2006) of 
X. Conceptually, 
X 
captures the same idea as the issuer-repurchaser spread (ISSREP
X) and the two measures are 
highly correlated over time. For example, the correlation between the issuer-repurchaser spread 
for size and the corresponding 
ME time series is 0.79.
10 
  Using this time-series of 
X, we now estimate annual firm-level panel regressions of the 
form:  
  , 1 ,1 2 1 ,1 ,1 , () .
X
it t it t it it it Ra b X b X c N S u            (11) 
The right-hand side includes lagged values of net issuance, lagged values of the characteristic, 
and interactions of the characteristic with the issuance tilt 
X. We include year fixed effects ( t a ) 
so as to focus on cross-sectional patterns in stock returns.  We include NS in all specifications in 
order to control for the direct relationship between net issuance and stock returns. To the extent 
that we obtain a negative coefficient on the interaction term, b2, it suggests that firms’ issuance 
behavior contains information about future characteristic returns. Standard errors are clustered by 
year to account for the cross-sectional correlation of residuals.  
Table 7 shows these results which largely confirm our earlier conclusions. Characteristic 
issuance tilts predict stock returns for the following attributes: book-to-market, size, price, and 
                                                            
10 However, 
X is somewhat less correlated with the issuer-repurchaser spreads for growth-related characteristics. 
For example, the correlation between 
B/M and the corresponding issuer repurchase spread is 0.18. The lower 




distress. Accruals, age, , volatility, and dividend policy all attract t-statistics greater than 1.40.
11 
In Panel B, we re-estimate the panel regression (11) for each characteristic, additionally 
controlling for firm-specific size, book-to-market, momentum, and beta. As shown in the table, 
these results are quite similar to those shown in Panel A. 
 
V.  Discussion 
The correlations between the returns of characteristic-based portfolios and our issuer-
repurchase spreads do not by themselves prove that characteristics are subject to time-varying 
mispricing. By extension, we cannot yet conclude that firms exploit time-varying characteristic 
demand in formulating their issuance and repurchase decisions. In this section, we consider and 
test two explanations for our results which are consistent with market efficiency. We then ask 
whether the evidence could be consistent with the view that issuance and repurchase activity is 
partly an attempt to time characteristic mispricing. 
The simplest rational explanation for our results follows directly from the Modigliani and 
Miller (1958) theorem. It works as follows. Holding constant investors’ required return on assets, 
when firms issue equity, the ratio of debt to total assets falls and investors’ required return on 
equity falls mechanically. Eckbo, Masulis, and Norli (2000) argue that this deleveraging effect 
can explain why issuers generally underperform in the years after issuance. Baker and Wurgler 
(2000) argue that the effects on leverage are too small to explain the relationship between 
aggregate equity issuance and market returns. With respect to forecasting characteristic returns, 
we can rule out this explanation quite easily because our issuer-repurchaser spreads forecast the 
                                                            
11 We note that differences between the 1963-2007 and 1973-2007 periods in Table 7 are minimal; this is because 
the panel approach weights all firms-years equally, thus giving a higher effective weight to later sample years. 





returns of firms that do not issue. Non-issuers share characteristics with issuing firms, but do not 
experience changes in leverage and thus should not experience any mechanical changes in 
required returns. In Table 5, for example, where we forecast purged characteristic returns, the 
coefficients on ISSREP
X are virtually unchanged from the baseline regressions shown in Table 4, 
particularly for B/M, size, price, and distress. We can draw the same lesson from our panel 
regressions. In Table 7, we forecast characteristic-level returns controlling for each firm’s 
individual issue and repurchase decisions.  
A subtle variation of the Modigliani and Miller (1958) leverage effect is put forth by 
Carlson, Fisher, and Giammarino (2004). They argue that stock issuers experience lower returns 
post-issuance because firms extinguish growth options when they decide to invest. These growth 
options act as a form of operating leverage. Thus, when growth options are exercised, required 
returns to the equity holders should fall. In a follow-up article, Carlson, Fisher, and Giammarino 
(2006) argue that this theory can help explain the general underperformance of secondary equity 
offerings. We do not dispute the potential importance of this channel in explaining the returns to 
issuers; however, this channel cannot explain our results for the same reason as above. 
Specifically, because we can forecast the returns to characteristics-based portfolios for non-
issuers, which do not experience changes in operating leverage. 
A second potential explanation for our results is that issuance is simply a noisy proxy for 
investment which itself responds to changes in rationally required returns. Specifically, suppose 
that some risk factor has a time-varying price of risk, and that a given characteristic X  is 
positively correlated with loadings on the risk factor. Consider what happens when the price of 
risk falls. Firms with high values of the characteristic (and hence high loadings on the risk factor) 
experience the largest declines in their required returns. These firms will raise their investment 




on the extensive margin as well (i.e., some firms that did not invest now choose to invest), then 
the factor loading and characteristic value for the marginal investing firm will rise. As a result, 
the average value of X among issuing firms may rise, potentially explaining the forecasting 
power of ISSREP
X.
12 How can we distinguish this explanation from one in which issuance and 
repurchase decisions are driven by firms’ desire to exploit mispricing? The key is that in a fully 
rational story, measures of investment should drive out issuance as a forecaster of returns. 
Intuitively, issuance is simply a noisy proxy for investment because it also reflects largely 
uninformative decisions about how any investment should be financed. This prediction can be 
derived more formally in a model which allows for both time-series variation in rationally 
required returns as well as temporary mispricing. In the Appendix, we work out the details of 
such a model. 
We can implement this idea empirically by constructing time-series which compare the 
characteristics of high investment firms with the characteristics of low investment firms.
13 We 
define the investment-non-investment spread for X as the difference between the average X-
decile of firms in the top NYSE quintile of investment and the average X-decile of firms in the 
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12 More formally, suppose there is a single risk factor and that required returns are given by E t-1[Ri,t]=Rf  + it-1 
where i is firm i’s factor loading and t-1 is the positive, time-varying price of risk for exposure to this factor. 
Suppose that all firms have access to projects that require an outlay of I at t-1 and yield E[C] in expectation at t; 
these projects differ only in their risk as captured by i. Firm i invests at t-1 if  I ≤ E[C]/E t-1[Ri,t] ori ≤ ߚ௧ିଵ
כ  
=(E[C]/I –Rf)/t-1. Note that the factor loading of both the marginal investing firm, ߚ௧ିଵ
כ , and the average investing 
firm, E[i | i≤ ߚ௧ିଵ
כ ] are decreasing in the price of risk, t-1. Assuming that Xi is positively correlated with i , this 
implies that the average value of X among investing firms will also be decreasing in t-1. 




For example,  1 1
ME
t INVNONINV    indicates that high investment firms were on average 
one size decile larger than low investment firms in year t-1. To measure investment in equation 
(14), we use capital expenditures over assets (CAPX/A). We also construct INVNONINV using 
debt growth. Investment can be funded using either debt, equity, or internal funds, but 
mispricing-related explanations would have firms favor equity over debt when equity was 
perceived to be overvalued. Thus, debt growth can be interpreted as residual investment after 
netting out the portion that is funded by equity.
14 
Table 8 summarizes the INVNONINV
X variables, as well as describing their correlations 
with the corresponding characteristic issuer-repurchaser spreads. As expected, the table shows 
that INVNONINV
X is generally positively correlated with ISSREP
X, with an average correlation 
of 0.32 in Panel A and 0.21 in Panel B. There are some exceptions, however. For instance, the 
correlation between the investment based spread and ISSREP
X actually turns negative in Panel A 
for the age and distress attributes. 




tt t R a c INVNONINV u    (13) 
Panel A shows these results when investment is measured using capital expenditures; in Panel B 
investment is the percentage growth in debt. As can be seen in the table, the results are mixed. 
For the full 1963-2007 sample period, only nominal share price is significant in both Panels A 
and B, while profitability (E/B) is also significant when investment is measured using debt 
growth. And, for six of the eleven characteristics, the sign goes the wrong direction when 
investment is measured using CAPX/A. The results are slightly stronger in the 1973-2007 period. 
                                                            
14 A related construction is to use asset growth as a measure of investment. This combines equity and debt funded 




For instance, the coefficient for size is now significant in Panel A and is marginally significant in 
Panel B. Overall, these investment-based measures have some modest ability to forecast 
characteristic-level returns. 
In Table 10, we run a horse-race between INVNONINV
X and our ISSREP
X variable to 
forecast future characteristic returns:  
  11
XX X
tt t t R a b ISSREP c INVNONINV u     (14) 
Recall that under the null hypothesis where all time-variation in expected returns is due to 
variation in rationally required returns, ISSREP
X is simply a noisy proxy for INVNONINV
X. We 
consider first the results in Panel A, where investment is measured as capital expenditures. For 
nearly every characteristic, the coefficient b on ISSREP
X is nearly identical to its value in the 
univariate regressions shown in Table 4. For example, for the 1963-2007 sample period, b=-
0.713 for book-to-market and -0.214 for size in Table 4, and -0.734 and -0.229 in Table 10. 
Interestingly, the coefficient c on INVNONINV
X is no longer significant for a single 
characteristic, and the vast majority of the time goes in the wrong direction. This same general 
pattern emerges in Panel B where investment is measured as the percentage change in debt. 
While c is statistically significant for sales growth in the 1963-2007 period and for share price 
and profitability in the 1973-2007 period, the coefficients on ISSREP
X  are again largely 
unaffected in Panel B. In summary, explanations based on time-varying risk premia – at least 
insofar as they should drive firm-level investment – do not fare well in our forecasting 
regressions. 
One potential objection is that these rational explanations link required returns to 
investment plans, but there may be a short gap between investment plans and realized investment 




investment plans than investment itself. While we cannot rule out this explanation entirely, we 
can look ahead to firms’ future investment rates. Specifically, we can construct INVNOINV
X 
based on future capital expenditures, and run the same horse race as shown in Table 10. These 
results are similar (see Internet Appendix) in that the coefficients on ISSREP
X are virtually 
unchanged compared to the univariate specifications in Table 4. Another robustness test is 
construct INVNOINV
X based on asset growth (conceptually we prefer measures based on capital 
expenditures or debt growth because asset growth combines growth in both financial and real 
assets, and thus is mechanically linked to equity issues). In the Internet Appendix, we show 
results for this alternate construction as well, reaching similar conclusions. 
Taken together, it is difficult to fully explain our results within a straightforward rational 
framework. At the same time, our results do not show that all time variation in expected 
characteristic returns is due to mispricing. However, they do lend support to the view that public 
companies have successfully timed characteristic returns in their issuance and repurchase 
decisions.  
 
VI.  Evaluating the importance of characteristic timing for corporate issuance 
The previous section suggests that issuance and repurchase activity is partly an attempt to 
exploit time-varying characteristic mispricing. But what fraction of the underperformance of net 
issuers does such characteristic timing explain? We can address this question by modifying the 
approach in Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers (1997). Specifically, we decompose the 
return to a long-short strategy based on net stock issuance into three components: the return in 
excess of the return on firms with similar characteristics (“characteristic selectivity”), the return 




style”), and the return associated with the timing of those characteristics (“characteristic 
timing”).  
Each year we form a portfolio that is long (short) firms in the lowest (highest) NYSE 
decile of net stock issuance. Motivated by our earlier findings, we limit our matching 
characteristics to size and book-to-market, so the results should be seen as a lower bound 
estimate of the importance of characteristic timing. We match each firm in this portfolio to one 
of 25 size and book-to-market benchmark portfolios. To construct these benchmarks, firms are 
first grouped by NYSE size quintile, and within each size quintile, we then sort firms into book-
to-market quintiles. The benchmark portfolios include only seasoned firms that did not issue or 
repurchase stock in the prior year. 
Following Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers (1997), characteristic selectivity is the 
difference between the portfolio return and the weighted return on the matched benchmark 
portfolios.  Next, let  ,1 bt w   denote the total portfolio weight of firms matched to benchmark b at 
time t-1. The average style and characteristic timing components of the net issuance portfolio 
return are  
tb
b
t b ASw R   
, and   (15) 
,1 ()
b
tb b tb t Cw w TR    . (16) 
where  b w denotes the time-series mean of  b w . The average style term reflects the performance on 
a benchmark portfolio that captures the average size and B/M composition of the NS portfolio. 
The characteristic timing component reflects deviations of the current size and B/M composition 
of the portfolio from its long-run average.
15 
                                                            
15 Our measure captures the ability of issuers to time characteristics at both short and long horizons whereas the 




We report the results of this decomposition in Table 11. Each row decomposes the return 
on the net stock issuance portfolio into CS, AS, and CT components. We show results for both 
value and equal-weighted portfolios based on NS. The first column shows the average return to 
the long-short NS strategy. For the value-weighted NS strategy, the 9.23% annual return can be 
decomposed into a 7.39% characteristic selectivity return, an -0.08% average style return, and a 
1.92% characteristic timing return. Thus, approximately 21 percent of the forecasting ability of 
NS in the cross-section comes from firms’ ability to time size and book-to-market characteristics. 
The results for the equal- and value-weighted portfolios are similar. 
 
VII.  Conclusion 
Firms are well suited to time broad patterns of characteristic-based mispricing. When 
investors demand a particular characteristic, firms absorb some of that demand by issuing new 
equity. When a particular characteristic is out of favor, firms endowed with that characteristic 
repurchase shares. Consistent with this idea, time-series variation in the differences between the 
attributes of stock issuers and repurchasers forecasts characteristic-related stock returns. Our 
approach helps forecast returns to portfolios based on book-to-market, size, share price, distress, 
payout policy, profitability, and industry.  
Our work has implications for the large literature that studies the stock market 
performance of SEOs, IPOs, and recent acquirers. In many of these studies, researchers purge the 
returns of event firms of size and book-to-market effects. Our findings suggest that this 
methodology is too conservative, since, for example, low market-to-book firms issue stock just 
prior to periods when low market-to-book firms in general are going to perform poorly. More 




characteristics will omit any returns coming from event firms’ ability to time those 
characteristics. 
Although characteristic timing based on size and book-to-market only explains a modest 
portion of the total underperformance of issuers, it is interesting to contrast this with studies of 
mutual fund performance (i.e. Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers (1997) and Wermers (2000)). 
These studies typically find that mutual funds have very small or even slightly negative 
characteristic timing ability. The contrast between these studies and our findings for issuing 
firms is consistent with the view that corporations may have a comparative advantage over 
professional investors in attacking certain forms of broad-based mispricing. This advantage may 
be greatest when mispricing converges slowly or is associated with undiversifiable risk. It is 
plausible that these conditions could be satisfied for the most salient characteristics we consider, 




Appendix A: Corporate investment and issuance in a model  
with time-varying rational discount rates and mispricing 
Our model draws on Stein (1996).  Managers maximize the net present value of investment f(I) 
of which E is funded with equity and the remaining (I-E) with debt.  The firm’s target leverage 
ratio is  (0,1) D .  All projects must be financed externally, and all external capital must be 
devoted to investment. The manager solves: 
   , max ( )/ 1 / ( (1 ) ) IE F F f IR IE RR Z E D I        (A1) 
where RF is the (possibly time-varying) rationally required return for the project and R =  RF is 
the conditional expected return that takes into account the expected mean reversion of any 
temporary mispricing.  We assume that  '0 , ' '0 , ff   and that  () Z   is a convex U-shaped 
function with Z(0) = 0. When  < 1 the firm’s stock is temporarily overvalued and when  > 1 
the firm’s stock is temporarily undervalued.  The first two terms capture the manager’s desire to 
maximize the long-term fundamentals-based net present value of investment; the second term 
captures the manager’s desire to issue stock to exploit any temporary mispricing and reflects the 
value transfer to long-term shareholders from short-term shareholders who buy mispriced equity; 
the third term represents the costs of deviating from target leverage ratio D.  The third term 
implies that firms do not respond with infinite elasticity at the slightest bit of mispricing and that 
investment as well as equity issuance may respond to mispricing. The first order conditions are: 
** * ( ) / 1 (1 ) ( (1 ) ) 0, F fI R D ZE D I         (A2) 
and 
** 1( ( 1 ) ) . Z ED I       (A3) 
We explore these results under a simple parameterization, where f(I)=log(I) and Z(L)= ½θL
2.  In 
this case, equations (A2) and (A3) simplify to the following expressions for optimal investment I 
and equity issuance E: 
   
11 *1 (1 ) 1 (1 )(1 ) FF ID R D R R D
 
       ,  (A4) 
and 
** (1 ) (1 ) / . ED I       (A5) 
Equation (A4) states that the hurdle rate for investment is a weighted average of the rationally 
required return (which may vary over time) and the conditional expected return which reflects 
the expected mean reversion of any temporary mispricing.  Intuitively, because it is costly for 
firms to deviate from their target capital structure and because firms cannot issue equity and hold 
the proceeds in cash indefinitely, investment may also respond to temporary mispricing if 
managers are trying to time the market.  Equation (A5) states that equity issuance reflects 
optimal investment and the firm’s target capital structure, plus the deviation from target leverage 
due to market timing (the manager want to issue more stock when .  
  The discussion above suggests that issuance and investment may each be useful for 
forecasting future returns because they contain different information about rationally required 
returns (RF) and the expected reversion of any mispricing ().  A multivariate regression that 
includes both equity issuance and investment as a control can help to isolate the effect of time-
varying mispricing.  To see this formally, we use lower case letters to denote logs (i.e, let 




mispricing (=1) and rationally required returns are R . This yields the following expressions for 
log investment and equity issuance at time t: 
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  (A7) 
Consider the following thought experiment, in which we compare the effect of changes in the 
rational discount rate (rF,t) on it
*and et
*, with the effect of changes in expected returns due to 
mispricing (t). Reductions in rF,t increase both investment and equity issuance one-for-one.  
Reductions in t increase investment, but less so than reductions in rF,t.  This is because 
managers trade off the benefits of market timing against the costs of overinvestment.  The above 
expressions also show that et
* will respond more elastically than it
* to changes in t.  Moreover, 
assuming that   /( ( 1 )) RD D    so that the costs of deviating from target leverage are not too 
high, issuance will respond more to a given change in t than a comparable change in rF,t. 
Now suppose that the realized log return at time t+1 is given by rt+1 =rF,t + tt+1 and 
assume that the three terms are uncorrelated. We first consider the case in which there is time 
series variation in both rF,t and t.  Now, the coefficient on et
* in a univariate return forecasting 
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Similarly, the coefficient on it
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By contrast in a multivariate regression, we have: 
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   (A10) 
Again, assuming that  /( ( 1 )) RD D   , it follows that  10 um bb    and  10 um cc    . 
That is, the coefficients on equity issuance and investment from a multivariate regression that 
includes both variables will be smaller in magnitude than the corresponding univariate 
coefficients due to a classic omitted variable bias. 
  However, in a fully rational model with Var[t] = 0 or in the absence of managerial 
attempts to time mispricing, one would expect investment to drive out issuance in a multivariate 
specification as long as there is some amount of noise in financing decisions. (In the absence of 
any noise, investment and issuance would be perfectly collinear in this case.) One way to model 
this noise is to assume that target leverage ratios fluctuate in ways that are uncorrelated with 















  (A11) 
where  t dd  represents the deviation of target leverage from its long-run mean. The intuition is 




investment when  1  .  In this case, the coefficient on investment from a univariate forecasting 
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  (A13) 
(A13) reduces to (A10) when Var[dt] = 0. It is straightforward to see from (A13) that so long as 
Var[dt] > 0 investment will completely drive out issuance in a horse race when Var[rF,t] = 0 or 
Var[t] = 0. The same result obtains if managers do not issue equity to exploit mispricing. The 
intuition is that in each case, equity issuance contains no additional information about expected 
returns over and above investment. Thus, it is driven out in a horse race because it also reflects a 




Appendix B: Characteristic Definitions 
 
Where applicable, we provide in parentheses the relevant Compustat data items from the 
Fundamentals Annual file. When matching to returns in July of year t to June of t+1, we follow 
the Fama and French (1992) convention that accounting variables are measured as of fiscal year 
ending t-1, and market-based variables (ME, P, , , as well as the market-based components of 
SHUM) are measured as of June of year t. However, we label all of these characteristics as year 
t-1 for notational convenience.  
Book-to-market equity (B/M): Book equity is stockholder's equity, plus balance sheet deferred 
taxes (item TXDB) and investment tax credits (ITCB) each when available, minus preferred 
stock. For stockholder’s equity we use item SEQ when available; if SEQ is missing we use the 
book value of common equity (CEQ) plus the book value of preferred stock (PSTK); finally, we 
use total assets (AT) minus total liabilities (LT) minus minority interest (MIB). For preferred 
stock we use redemption value (PSTKRV), liquidation value (PSTKL), and book value (PSTK) in 
that order. We divide book equity for fiscal years ending in year t-1 by the value of market 
equity at the end of December in year t-1 from CRSP. 
Sales Growth (ΔS t/S t-1): Sales growth is the log change in sales (SALE).  
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where current assets is Compustat item ACT, cash is item CHE, current liabilities is item LCT, 
taxes payable is item TXP, and depreciation is item DP. 
Size: Size is market equity (ME) at the end of June in year t. 
Price: Price is the nominal price per share at the end of June in year t. 
Age: Age is number of years since the first appearance of a firm (PERMCO) on CRSP measured 
to the nearest month. 
Beta () and Volatility ()Beta and volatility are estimated from a trailing 24-month CAPM 
regression. We require that a firm has valid returns for at least 12 of the previous 24 months.  
Distress (SHUM): We use the bankruptcy hazard rate estimated by Shumway (2001): 
exp( )/ (1 exp( )) SHUM H H  where 
0.46 17 3.303 1.982 / 3.59 1.809 ( ) 5 37 /. 9 1 M H NI A L A RELSIZE R R               
NI/A is net income over period-end assets, L/A is total liabilities over assets, RELSIZE is the log 
of a firm's market equity divided by the total capitalization of all NYSE and AMEX stocks, 
M R R   is firm's cumulative return over the prior 12-months minus the cumulative return on the 
value-weighted NYSE/AMEX index, and σ is volatility of residuals from trailing 12-month 
market-model regression.  
Dividends (Div): Div is a dummy variable equal to one for dividend payers (firms for which 
DVPSXF>0) and zero for nonpayers.  
Profitability (E/B): Earnings (E) is income before extraordinary available for common (IBCOM) 
plus income statement deferred taxes (TXDI) when available. Income is scaled by average book 
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Figure 1. Distribution of split-adjusted share growth. The distribution of percentage changes in split-adjusted shares outstanding in 
fiscal 1984. Repurchasers are seasoned firms that reduce split-adjusted shares outstanding by more than 0.5% during the fiscal year. 
Issuers are seasoned firms that increase shares outstanding by more than 10% during the fiscal year. These breakpoints are indicated 
using dashed lines below. Seasoned firms that are not classified as issuers or repurchasers are classified as “others.” The figure does not 














































































































Figure 2.  Issuer-repurchaser spreads 1962-2006. We plot the difference between the average characteristics of stock issuers and stock 
repurchasers. Characteristics include the book-to-market ratio (B/M), sales growth (ΔS/S), accruals (Acc/A), market equity (ME), nominal 
share price (P), Age, CAPM beta (),  CAPM residual volatility (σ), distress (SHUM) proxied using the Shumway (2001) bankruptcy 
hazard rate, dividend policy (Div), and profitability (E/B). All characteristics except for dividend policy are measured by their NYSE 
decile rank; dividend policy is a dummy variable that takes a value of one if the firm paid a dividend in that year. 
Panel A: Book-to-Market (B/M)  Panel B: Sales Growth (ΔS/S) 
Panel C: Accruals (Acc/A)  Panel D: Market Equity (ME) 
Panel E: Share Price (P) Panel  F:  Age 
Panel G: Beta ()  Panel H: Volatility (σ) 



















































































































































































































































































Figure 3.  Issuer-repurchaser spreads 1962-2006 [Continued]  
Panel I: Distress (SHUM)  Panel J: Dividend policy (Div) 
























































































Table 1. Summary Statistics.  Mean, median, standard deviation and extreme values of issuance, firm characteristics, and returns. To be 
included in the sample, the firm must (1) report positive book equity in the fiscal year ending in calendar year t-1 and (2) have CRSP 
market equity in June of year t. Panel A summarizes net stock issuance (NS) defined as the percentage change in split-adjusted shares 
outstanding from Compustat from year t-2 to t-1. Panel B summarizes firm characteristics, grouped along the themes of growth, size and 
risk, and profitability. Book-to-market (B/M) is the ratio of book equity to market equity (shares outstanding times stock price in 
December of t-1 from CRSP). Book equity (B) is stockholder’s equity plus balance sheet deferred taxes and investment tax credit, minus 
preferred stock calculated according to details in the Appendix. Sales growth (ΔSt/St-1) is the percentage increase in sales. Our definitions 
of accruals (Acc/A) follows Bergstresser and Philippon (2006). Market equity (ME) is price times shares outstanding in June of year t from 
CRSP. Nominal share price (P) is the price in June of year t. Age is the number of years since the first appearance of the firm (PERMCO) 
on CRSP. CAPM beta (β) is the slope coefficient from a regression of excess returns on the value-weighted market excess return 
(MKTRF), estimated using the previous 24-months of data, and requiring at least 12-months of data. Volatility (σ) is the residual standard 
deviation from this regression. Distress (SHUM) is the bankruptcy hazard rate estimated by Shumway (2001). Dividend policy (Div) is an 
indicator that takes a value of one if the firm paid dividends in year t-1. Profitability (E/B) is income before extraordinary available for 
common plus income statement deferred taxes all over book equity. All continuous variables in Panels A and B are winsorized in each 
cross-section at the 0.5 and 99.5 percent levels. Panel C summarizes issuer repurchaser spreads. The issuer repurchaser spread for 
characteristic X is the difference between the mean NYSE decile of X between stock issuers and repurchasers in that year. Panel D 
summarizes value-weighted long-short portfolio returns based on the characteristics summarized in Panel B. The construction of these 
long-short returns follows the Fama and French (1993) procedure for constructing HML and is described in detail in the text.  
  N Mean  Median  SD  Min  Max 
  Panel A: Net Stock Issuance (Firm-years) 
Net stock issuance (NS) %  172,693  8.08  0.51  28.59  -35.49  499.23 
  Panel B: Characteristics (Firm-years 1962-2006) 
Book-to-Market (B/M)  175,111 0.90 0.67 0.87 0.01  12.18 
Sales growth (ΔS/S t-1 %)  %  170,039 14.57 10.70 37.72  -216.56  316.11 
Accruals (Acc/A)  %  147,346 -2.42 -3.02 11.14  -57.06 63.88 
Size (Log(ME))  175,111 4.49 4.34 2.13  -3.23  13.17 
Price (P)  175,111 18.08 13.25 17.48  0.06  168.50 
Age  175,111 13.27  8.42 14.07  0.00 81.00 
Beta ()  169,172 1.13 1.03 1.03  -4.23 7.40 
Volatility (σ)  %  169,172 13.03 10.87  8.45  2.20 80.35 
Distress (SHUM)  %  155,336 1.99 0.25 7.39 0.00  98.75 
Dividend Policy (Div)  172,424 0.47 0.00 0.50 0.00 1.00 
Profitability (E/B) %  172,477  0.65  10.27  47.97  -647.90  298.53 
  Panel C: Issuer-repurchaser spreads (Annual 1962-2006) 
B/M (High - Low)  45  -1.78  -1.75  0.58  -3.05  -0.35 
ΔS/S t-1 (High  -  Low)  45 2.62 2.57 0.61 1.62 3.82 
Acc/A (High - Low)  45  1.30  1.27  0.87  -0.12  3.53 
ME (High - Low)  45  -0.16  -0.32  1.23  -2.48  2.76 
P (High - Low)  45  -0.67  -1.03  1.22  -2.40  2.28 
Age  (High - Low)  45  -1.21  -1.47  0.83  -2.45  1.03 
 (High - Low)  45 1.18 1.05 0.88  -0.60 3.34 
σ  (High - Low)  45  1.50  1.83  1.57  -2.33  4.07 
SHUM (High - Low)  45  0.73  0.83  0.84  -1.45  2.98 
Div (Payer - Nonpayer)  45  -0.26  -0.31  0.16  -0.50  0.11 
E/B (High - Low)  45  -0.15  -0.06  1.40  -2.53  2.47 
  Panel D: Characteristic-based portfolio returns (Monthly % July 1963-June 2008) 
B/M (High - Low)  540  0.44  0.42  2.95  -13.94  13.95 
ΔS/S t-1 (High  -  Low)  540 -0.09 -0.07  2.17 -7.35  9.62 
Acc/A (High - Low)  540  -0.29  -0.36  1.65  -5.59  6.32 
ME (High - Low)  540  -0.22  -0.04  3.18  -22.38  17.13 
P (High - Low)  540  0.04  0.12  3.06  -18.88  9.62 
Age  (High - Low)  540  -0.01  -0.08  3.96  -15.99  19.33 
 (High – Low)  540 0.17 0.07 2.79  -17.23  16.49 
σ  (High - Low)  540  0.07  -0.03  4.72  -18.60  31.16 
SHUM (High - Low)  540  -0.14  -0.12  2.93  -9.44  10.80 
Div (Payer - Nonpayer)  540  -0.08  0.04  4.35  -21.45  16.36 
E/B (High - Low)  540  0.10  0.07  2.26  -15.70  11.02 46 
 
Table 2. Stock issuers, non-issuers, and repurchasers 1962-2006. The first appearance of a PERMCO is classified as a new list. 
Issuers are seasoned firms that increase shares outstanding by more than 10% during the fiscal year. Repurchasers are seasoned firms that 
reduce split-adjusted shares outstanding by more than 0.5% during the fiscal year. Seasoned firms that are not classified as issuers or 
repurchasers are classified as “others.” The right-hand columns show the mean change in split-adjusted shares outstanding for firms in 
each group. Changes in firm shares outstanding are winsorized at the 0.5 and 99.5 percent levels. 
Fiscal 
Year 
Counts by firm type    Mean Change in Shares Outstanding (%) 
All Firms  New Lists  Issuers  Repurchasers  Others    Issuers  Repurchasers  Others 
1962  1,033 331  31  73  598    22.1 -3.0  0.8 
1963  1,149 41  67  110  931    27.1 -3.2  0.8 
1964  1,240 61  57  132  990    22.5 -2.7  0.9 
1965  1,330 68  74  132  1,056    27.0 -3.1  0.9 
1966  1,426 62  92  162  1,110    20.5 -2.6  1.0 
1967  1,515 75  145  78  1,217    25.8 -3.1  1.2 
1968  1,650 105  276  71  1,198    26.1 -2.9  1.5 
1969  1,823 147  254  110  1,312    24.5 -2.5  1.7 
1970  1,960 95  165  188  1,512    23.4 -2.6  1.4 
1971  2,060 100  174  144  1,642    21.6 -3.0  1.3 
1972  2,848 771  209  168  1,700    20.2 -2.7  1.3 
1973  3,379 52  245  592  2,490    19.8 -3.9  1.1 
1974  3,396 31  146  611  2,608    18.2 -4.5  0.7 
1975  3,756 61  192  536  2,967    18.9 -4.8  0.7 
1976  3,832 92  224  473  3,043    19.3 -5.9  0.8 
1977  3,771 78  241  504  2,948    19.1 -6.2  0.9 
1978  3,742 97  279  443  2,923    21.3 -5.9  1.1 
1979  3,718 102  320  486  2,810    21.6 -5.6  1.1 
1980  3,787 197  407  432  2,751    23.7 -5.5  1.2 
1981  3,961 302  551  408  2,700    26.4 -5.1  1.4 
1982  4,027 129  481  521  2,896    27.7 -5.9  1.1 
1983  4,312 386  776  351  2,799    27.8 -5.5  1.4 
1984  4,424 274  654  545  2,951    33.2 -6.8  1.3 
1985  4,368 224  552  573  3,019    30.8 -6.5  1.3 
1986  4,512 409  714  499  2,890    32.4 -6.0  1.3 
1987  4,663 369  743  770  2,781    33.7 -5.8  1.4 
1988  4,575 203  588  917  2,867    36.0 -5.7  1.2 
1989  4,494 216  572  735  2,971    33.9 -5.3  1.2 
1990  4,456 223  536  863  2,834    33.9 -5.5  1.2 
1991  4,478 307  658  627  2,886    37.9 -5.0  1.2 
1992  4,736 407  919  430  2,980    39.6 -4.4  1.5 
1993  5,646 649  1,076  506  3,415    43.9 -4.5  1.7 
1994  5,967 551  1,028  731  3,657    42.3 -4.7  1.6 
1995  6,146 544  1,096  782  3,724    37.7 -4.4  1.6 
1996  6,518 758  1,323  907  3,530    40.8 -4.9  1.8 
1997  6,354 490  1,286  955  3,623    37.9 -4.9  1.8 
1998  5,906 367  1,079  1,163  3,297    36.9 -5.1  1.8 
1999  5,697 474  956  1,460  2,807    33.8 -5.7  1.8 
2000  5,485 413  1,044  1,422  2,606    35.2 -5.6  2.1 
2001  4,961 124  772  1,017  3,048    33.1 -5.1  1.9 
2002  4,626 115  590  901  3,020    29.7 -4.2  1.7 
2003  4,440 119  627  766  2,928    30.4 -4.3  1.7 
2004  4,408 233  755  606  2,814    31.7 -3.7  2.1 
2005  4,318 233  599  766  2,720    32.1 -4.0  2.1 
2006  4,218 219  612  886  2,501    30.6 -4.5  2.0 47 
 
Table 3. Correlations among characteristics and issuer-repurchaser spreads. Panel A shows the average cross-sectional correlations between firm characteristics. Firm characteristics 
include the book-to-market (B/M) ratio, sales growth (ΔS/S), accruals (Acc/A), Size (ME), nominal share price (P), Age, CAPM beta (β), residual volatility (σ), the Shumway bankruptcy 
hazard rate (SHUM), dividend policy (Div), and profitability (E/B). All variables are measured as NYSE deciles, except for dividend policy, which is a dummy variable taking a value of 
one when a firm paid a dividend.  Panel B shows the time-series correlation among issuer-repurchaser spreads based on the same set of characteristics. 
  B/M  ΔS/S Acc/A  ME  P  Age  β  σ SHUM  Div  E/B 
Panel A: Average Cross-sectional Correlations between Characteristics 
G r o w t h :               
B/M  1 . 0 0            
S/S t-1  - 0 . 2 9   1 . 0 0           
Acc/A  -0.10  0.25  1.00         
S i z e   a n d   R i s k :              
ME  -0.22  0.06  -0.04  1.00        
P  -0.22 0.10 0.00 0.76 1.00             
Age  0.17 -0.19 -0.08  0.42  0.34  1.00           
 -0.15 0.11 0.05  -0.03  -0.09  -0.11 1.00         
 -0.08 0.06 0.01  -0.52  -0.54  -0.37 0.36 1.00       
SHUM  0.27 -0.10  0.00 -0.63 -0.64 -0.26 -0.01  0.32  1.00     
Div  0.09 -0.07 -0.01  0.42  0.48  0.36 -0.22 -0.58 -0.27  1.00   
Profitability:             
E/B  -0.41 0.33 0.19 0.28 0.36 0.01 0.02  -0.19  -0.31 0.22 1.00 
Panel B: Time-series Correlations between Issuer-Repurchaser Spreads 
G r o w t h :              
B/M  1 . 0 0            
S/S t-1  - 0 . 3 3   1 . 0 0           
Acc/A  -0.45  0.72  1.00         
S i z e   a n d   R i s k :              
ME  -0.45 0.19 0.16 1.00               
P  -0.40 0.23 0.19 0.97 1.00             
Age  -0.15 0.11 0.02 0.85 0.87 1.00           
 -0.04  0.08 -0.07 -0.44 -0.51 -0.45  1.00         
  0.27 -0.08 -0.17 -0.89 -0.88 -0.83  0.68  1.00       
SHUM  0.25 0.10 0.19  -0.83  -0.80  -0.71 0.45 0.72 1.00     
Div  -0.25 0.12 0.26 0.88 0.90 0.85  -0.58  -0.94  -0.65 1.00   
Profitability:             




Table 4. Forecasting characteristic returns. Regressions of monthly long-short portfolio returns on lagged values of the issuer-
repurchaser spread for the corresponding characteristic, controlling for contemporaneous returns on the market (MKTRF), the Fama-
French factors (HML and SMB) and a momentum factor (UMD): 
1
XX
tt t t t t t R a b ISSREP c MKTRF d HML e SMB f UMD u       
 
The univariate regressions in panel A are estimated excluding the controls. The sample period includes monthly returns from July 1963 to 
June 2008. The long-short portfolios are formed based on firm characteristics: the book-to-market (B/M) ratio, sales growth (ΔS/S), 
accruals (Acc/A), Size (ME), nominal share price (P), Age, CAPM beta (β), residual volatility (σ), the Shumway bankruptcy hazard rate 
(SHUM), dividend policy (Div), and profitability (E/B). All characteristics except for dividend policy are measured as their NYSE decile 
rank; dividend policy is measured by a dummy variable that takes a value of one if the firm paid a dividend in year t-1. In the table, 
characteristics are grouped by theme: growth, size and risk, or profitability. Monthly returns between July of year t and June of year t+1 
are matched to the issuer-repurchaser spread in year t-1. Since ISSREPt-1 is only refreshed annually, standard errors are clustered by 12-
month blocks running from July t to June t+1. t-statistics are in brackets. 
 
Panel A: Univariate   Panel B: Multivariate 
  1963-2007  1973-2007  1963-2007  1973-2007 
  b [t]  b [t]  b [t]  b [t] 
Growth:          
B/M  -0.713 [-2.69] -0.815 [-2.29] -0.631 [-2.65] -0.761 [-2.50] 
ΔS/S t-1 0.075  [0.59]  -0.198  [-0.79] 0.170 [1.30] 0.058 [0.32] 
Acc/A  -0.021 [-0.23] -0.088 [-0.64] -0.031 [-0.38] -0.079 [-0.53] 
          
S i z e   a n d   R i s k :           
ME  -0.214 [-1.60] -0.316 [-3.65] -0.312 [-2.72] -0.404 [-5.04] 
P  -0.260 [-3.18] -0.336 [-4.03] -0.099 [-1.30] -0.082 [-1.21] 
Age  -0.134 [-0.95] -0.113 [-0.78] -0.119 [-1.39] -0.081 [-0.99] 
 -0.270 [-0.96] -0.401 [-1.24] -0.261 [-1.83] -0.303 [-1.80] 
  -0.078 [-0.51] -0.127 [-0.96] -0.066 [-0.76] -0.043 [-0.50] 
SHUM  -0.381 [-1.68] -0.624 [-2.93] -0.170 [-1.29] -0.218 [-1.79] 
Div  -1.407 [-1.13] -2.332 [-2.27] -0.795    [-1.17]  -1.301  [-1.92] 
          
Profitability:          




Table 5. Forecasting issuance purged characteristic returns. Regressions of monthly long-short portfolio returns on lagged values of 
the issuer-repurchaser spread for the corresponding characteristic, controlling for contemporaneous returns on the market (MKTRF), the 
Fama-French factors (HML and SMB) and a momentum factor (UMD): 
1
XX
tt t t t t t R a b ISSREP c MKTRF d HML e SMB f UMD u       
 
The long-short portfolios are computed using only the subset of seasoned firms that did not issue or repurchase stock in the prior fiscal 
year. The univariate regressions in panel A are estimated excluding the controls. The sample period includes monthly returns from July 
1963 to June 2008. The long-short portfolios are formed based on firm characteristics: the book-to-market (B/M) ratio, sales growth 
(ΔS/S), accruals (Acc/A), Size (ME), nominal share price (P), Age, CAPM beta (β), residual volatility (σ), the Shumway bankruptcy 
hazard rate (SHUM), dividend policy (Div), and profitability (E/B). All characteristics except for dividend policy are measured as their 
NYSE decile rank; dividend policy is measured by a dummy variable that takes a value of one if the firm paid a dividend in that year. In 
the table, characteristics are grouped by theme: growth, size and risk, or profitability. Monthly returns between July of year t and June of 
year t+1 are matched to the issuer-repurchaser spread in year t-1. Since ISSREPt-1 is only refreshed annually, standard errors are clustered 
by 12-month blocks running from July t to June t+1. t-statistics are in brackets. 
 
Panel A: Univariate Forecasts of Purged Returns  Panel B: Multivariate forecasts of Purged Returns 
  1963-2007  1973-2007  1963-2007  1973-2007 
  b [t]  b [t]  b [t]  b [t] 
G r o w t h :           
B/M  -0.607 [-2.42] -0.678 [-2.02] -0.514 [-2.29] -0.609 [-2.10] 
ΔS/S t-1  0.162 [1.25] 0.009 [0.03] 0.235 [1.94] 0.234 [1.19] 
Acc/A  0.040 [0.44] 0.023 [0.15] 0.033 [0.38] 0.031 [0.19] 
          
S i z e   a n d   R i s k :           
ME  -0.223 [-1.61] -0.338 [-3.71] -0.311 [-2.60] -0.415 [-4.88] 
P  -0.233 [-2.71] -0.325 [-3.53] -0.082 [-1.14] -0.081 [-1.17] 
Age  -0.034 [-0.29] -0.004 [-0.03] -0.009 [-0.14]  0.029 [0.43] 
 -0.187 [-0.70] -0.317 [-1.04] -0.179 [-1.28] -0.220 [-1.35] 
  -0.007 [-0.05] -0.053 [-0.45] 0.007 [0.10] 0.028 [0.37] 
SHUM  -0.372 [-1.56] -0.669 [-2.65] -0.151 [-1.18] -0.248 [-2.16] 
Div  -0.667 [-0.54] -1.494 [-1.50] -0.096 [-0.15] -0.584 [-0.94] 
          
Profitability:          






Table 6. Forecasting issuance purged industry characteristic returns. Estimates of pooled panel regressions forecasting monthly 
industry-level stock returns:  
,, 1 , 1 , 1 , 1 , 1 , jt t jt jt jt jt jt jt R ab N S c B M d M E e M O M f u              
 
R is the value-weighted return to stocks in industry j. Industry returns are constructed using only the subset of seasoned firms that did not 
issue or repurchase stock in the prior fiscal year. The independent variables, all lagged, include the value-weighted averages of net share 
issuance (NS) and book-to-market ratio (BM) for stocks in that industry, the log market capitalization of stocks in industry j (ME), the 
industry’s cumulative returns between months t-13 to t-2 (MOM), and the industry’s market beta (β). Industry definitions follow Fama 
and French (1997). All regressions include month fixed effects and standard errors are clustered at the month level. In Panel A, all right-
hand-side variables are continuous. In Panel B, all right-hand-side variables are measured by their industry ranks. The table only reports 
the coefficient b and its associated t-statistic. 
Panel A: NS = value-weighted industry net share issuance 
  1964-2007  1973-2007 
          
b  -0.019 -0.020 -0.024 -0.019 -0.015 -0.015 -0.020 -0.017 
[t]  [-2.16] [-2.23] [-2.42] [-2.03] [-1.57] [-1.66] [-1.93] [-1.68] 
          
Month  Effects:  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Effects:  No  No  Yes  Yes No No  Yes  Yes 
Controls: No  Yes  No  Yes  No Yes  No Yes 
R-squared:  0.494 0.497 0.495 0.498 0.491 0.493 0.492 0.494 
 
Panel B: NS = Rank of value-weighted industry net share issuance 
  1964-2007  1973-2007 
          
b  -0.835 -0.752 -1.194 -0.914 -0.755 -0.695 -1.227 -0.973 
[t]  [-2.74] [-2.60] [-3.46] [-2.75] [-2.25] [-2.13] [-3.05] [-2.51] 
          
Month  Effects:  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Effects:  No  No  Yes  Yes No No  Yes  Yes 
Controls: No  Yes  No  Yes  No Yes  No Yes 
R-squared:  0.495 0.497 0.495 0.498 0.491 0.493 0.492 0.494 
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Table 7. Two-stage panel forecasts of characteristic returns. In the first stage, we estimate annual cross-sectional regressions of net 
issuance NS on characteristic decile X:  
,1 1 1 ,1 ,1
, 1 ,1 2 1 ,1 ,1 , ()
X
it t t it it
X
it t it t it it it
NS X






     
 
The first stage regressions yield a series of annual estimates of 
X, the issuance tilt with respect to characteristic X. In the second stage, 
we run a panel regression of annual stock returns on lagged values of net issuance, lagged values of the characteristic, interactions of the 
characteristic with issuance tilt 
X, and a year fixed effect (at). The table shows estimates of b2, the coefficient on the interaction term. In 
Panel B, the panel regressions also include controls for lagged , book-to-market, size, and momentum. The sample period includes 
annual returns from 1963 to 2007. Annual returns from July of year t and June of t+1 are matched to characteristics in year t-1. Firm 
characteristics include the book-to-market (B/M) ratio, sales growth (ΔS/S), accruals (Acc/A), Size (ME), nominal share price (P), Age, 
CAPM beta (β), residual volatility (σ), the Shumway bankruptcy hazard rate (SHUM), dividend policy (Div), and profitability (E/B). All 
characteristics except for dividend policy are measured as their NYSE decile rank; dividend policy is a dummy variable that takes a value 
of one if the firm paid a dividend in that year. Standard errors are clustered by year with the corresponding t-statistics in brackets. 
 
  Panel A: Baseline Panel Results  Panel B: Controls for β, B/M, Size, and Momentum 
  1963-2007  1973-2007  1963-2007  1973-2007 
X  b2 [t] b2 [t] b2 [t] b2 [t] 
Growth:          
B/M -0.977  [-2.99]  -1.053  [-2.91]  -1.005 [-3.19] -1.068 [-3.03] 
ΔS/S t-1 -0.216  [-1.15]  -0.218  [-1.12]  -0.241 [-1.34] -0.247 [-1.32] 
Acc/A -0.331  [-1.79]  -0.340  [-1.79]  -0.272 [-1.43] -0.281 [-1.44] 
Size  and  Risk:         
ME -0.859  [-2.08]  -0.863  [-2.05]  -0.757 [-1.88] -0.771 [-1.86] 
P  -0.822 [-2.14] -0.810 [-2.04] -0.677 [-1.83] -0.670 [-1.73] 
Age -0.228  [-1.80]  -0.212  [-1.60] -0.217 [-1.74] -0.205 [-1.58] 
 -1.154 [-1.45] -1.171 [-1.43] -0.961 [-1.16] -1.012 [-1.20] 
  -0.774 [-1.42] -0.777 [-1.39] -0.619 [-1.16] -0.645 [-1.19] 
SHUM -1.537  [-2.13]  -1.527  [-2.08]  -1.421 [-2.04] -1.425 [-2.01] 
Div  -0.572 [-1.65] -0.574 [-1.61] -0.499 [-1.46] -0.506 [-1.44] 
Profitability:          
E/B -0.491  [-1.22]  -0.542  [-1.30]  -0.404 [-1.06] -0.487 [-1.25] 
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Table 8. Investment-based characteristic spreads. Summary statistics for investment-based characteristic spreads.  ρ denotes the 
correlation with the corresponding issuer-repurchaser spread. In Panel A, investment is measured as capital expenditures scaled by assets; 
in Panel B, investment is the percentage change in total debt. The investment-noninvestment spread for characteristic X is the difference 
between the average NYSE decile of X between top quintile investment firms and bottom quintile investment firms. Firm characteristics 
include the book-to-market (B/M) ratio, sales growth (ΔS/S), accruals (Acc/A), Size (ME), nominal share price (P), Age, CAPM beta (β), 










  N Mean  Median  SD  Min  Max  ρ 
  Panel A: Investment-based characteristic spreads (Investment = Capx/Assets) 
Book-to-Market (B/M)  45 -1.33 -1.17  0.55 -2.41 -0.43  0.11 
Sales growth (ΔS/S t-1 %)  %  45 1.36 1.37 0.58  -0.15 2.57  0.28 
Accruals (Acc/A)  %  45 -1.41 -1.41  0.50 -2.40 -0.18  0.11 
Size (Log(ME))  45 1.18 1.09 0.50 0.39 2.13  0.65 
Price (P)  45 1.00 0.95 0.51 0.12 1.92  0.72 
Age  45 -0.25 -0.26  0.48 -1.21  0.77  -0.11 
Beta ()  45 0.17 0.15 0.58  -1.18 1.93  0.26 
Volatility (σ)  %  45 -0.33 -0.45  0.71 -1.32  2.14  0.50 
Distress (SHUM)  %  45 -0.88 -0.83  0.50 -2.18  0.55  -0.07 
Dividend Policy (Div)  45 0.04 0.05 0.08  -0.20 0.15  0.40 
Profitability (E/B)  %  45 1.23 1.19 0.48 0.33 2.00  0.68 
  Panel B: Investment-based characteristic spreads (Investment = ΔDebt/Debt) 
Book-to-Market (B/M)  45 -0.51 -0.53  0.46 -1.19  0.36  0.29 
Sales growth (ΔS/S t-1 %)  %  45 1.70 1.70 0.35 0.94 2.45  0.44 
Accruals (Acc/A)  %  45 2.43 2.44 0.90 0.85 4.16  0.57 
Size (Log(ME))  45 0.35 0.33 0.29  -0.18 1.36  0.33 
Price (P)  45 0.36 0.35 0.30  -0.16 1.09  0.32 
Age  45 -0.36 -0.37  0.23 -0.90  0.19  -0.18 
Beta ()  45  -0.01 0.09 0.41  -0.94 1.02  0.08 
Volatility (σ)  %  45 -0.31 -0.24  0.39 -1.36  0.41  -0.21 
Distress (SHUM)  %  45 0.65 0.63 0.30 0.00 1.20  0.14 
Dividend Policy (Div)  45 0.05 0.05 0.05  -0.06 0.18  0.03 
Profitability (E/B)  %  45 0.33 0.36 0.44  -0.64 1.10  0.55 53 
 
Table 9. Forecasting characteristic returns using investment-non-investment spreads. Univariate time-series regressions of monthly 
long-short portfolio returns on lagged values of the investment-non-investment spread for the corresponding characteristic: 
1
XX
tt t R a c INVNONINV u    
 
The investment-non-investment spread is the difference between the average characteristic decile of high- and low- investment firms. In 
Panel A, investment is capital expenditures over assets. In Panel B, investment is the percentage change in debt. High investment firms 
are defined as those in the top NYSE quintile and low investment firms are those in the bottom NYSE quintile. The sample period 
includes monthly returns from July 1963 to June 2008. The long-short portfolios are formed based on firm characteristics: the book-to-
market (B/M) ratio, sales growth (ΔS/S), accruals (Acc/A), Size (ME), nominal share price (P), Age, CAPM beta (β), residual volatility 
(σ), the Shumway bankruptcy hazard rate (SHUM), dividend policy (Div), and profitability (E/B). All characteristics except for dividend 
policy are measured as their NYSE decile rank; dividend policy is measured by a dummy variable that takes a value of one if the firm 
paid a dividend in year t-1. In the table, characteristics are grouped by theme: growth, size and risk, or profitability. Monthly returns 
between July of year t and June of year t+1 are matched to the issuer-repurchaser spread in year t-1. Since INVNONINVt-1 is only 
refreshed annually, standard errors are clustered by 12-month blocks running from July t to June t+1. t-statistics are in brackets. 
 
Panel A: Investment = Capx/Assets  Panel B: Investment = ΔDebt/Debt 
  1963-2007  1973-2007  1963-2007  1973-2007 
  c [t]  c [t]  c [t]  c [t] 
Growth:          
B/M  0.116 [0.32] 0.053 [0.13] 0.160 [0.35] 0.092 [0.17] 
ΔS/S t-1  0.067 [0.42] 0.056 [0.32] -0.297 [-1.55] -0.502 [-1.43] 
Acc/A  -0.156 [-1.10] -0.140 [-1.02] -0.045 [-0.62] -0.042 [-0.66] 
                    
Size and Risk:                    
ME  -0.311 [-0.89] -0.708 [-2.01] 0.014 [0.03]  -0.983  [-1.54] 
P  -0.520 [-2.32] -0.769 [-3.27] -0.786 [-1.96] -1.458 [-3.01] 
Age  -0.246 [-0.95] -0.292 [-1.02] -0.608 [-1.01] -0.629 [-0.90] 
 0.407 [1.29] 0.227 [0.72] 0.307 [0.76] 0.243 [0.53] 
  0.266 [1.23] 0.056 [0.35] 0.418 [0.73] -0.084  [-0.13] 
SHUM  0.379 [1.26] 0.379 [1.17] 0.320 [0.61] 0.746 [1.04] 
Div  0.072 [0.04] -1.501  [-0.90] -2.510 [-0.55] -6.772 [-1.62] 
                    
Profitability:                    




Table 10. Forecasting characteristic returns using issuer repurchaser spreads and investment-non-investment spreads. Bivariate time-series regressions of monthly long-short 
portfolio returns on lagged values of the issuer-repurchaser spread and lagged values of the investment-non-investment spread for the corresponding characteristic: 
11
XX X
tt t t R a b ISSREP c INVNONINV u     
 
The issuer repurchaser spread is the difference between the average characteristic decile of issuers and repurchasers. The investment-non-investment spread is the difference between the 
average characteristic decile of high- and low- investment firms. High investment firms are defined as those in the top NYSE quintile and low investment firms are those in the bottom 
NYSE quintile. In Panel A, investment is capital expenditures over assets. In Panel B, investment is the percentage change in debt. The sample period includes monthly returns from July 
1963 to June 2008. The long-short portfolios are formed based on firm characteristics: the book-to-market (B/M) ratio, sales growth (ΔS/S), accruals (Acc/A), Size (ME), nominal share 
price (P), Age, CAPM beta (β), residual volatility (σ), the Shumway bankruptcy hazard rate (SHUM), dividend policy (Div), and profitability (E/B). All characteristics except for dividend 
policy are measured as their NYSE decile rank; dividend policy is measured by a dummy variable that takes a value of one if the firm paid a dividend in year t-1. In the table, 
characteristics are grouped by theme: growth, size and risk, or profitability. Monthly returns between July of year t and June of year t+1 are matched to the issuer-repurchaser spread in 
year t-1. Since ISSREPt-1 and INVNONINVt-1 are only refreshed annually, standard errors are clustered by 12-month blocks running from July t to June t+1. t-statistics are in brackets. 
  Panel A: Investment = Capx/Assets  Panel B: Investment = ΔDebt/Debt 
  1963-2007  1973-2007  1963-2007  1973-2007 
Growth:  b [t]  c [t]  b [t]  c [t]  b [t]  c [t]  b [t]  c [t] 
B/M -0.734  [-2.72]  0.203  [0.60]  -0.837  [-2.32] 0.162 [0.43]  -0.824  [-2.63] 0.465 [1.05] -0.875  [-2.26] 0.331 [0.64] 
ΔS/S t-1  0.061 [0.42] 0.049 [0.27] -0.204  [-0.78] 0.066 [0.36] 0.183 [1.25]  -0.438  [-1.89] -0.126 [-0.48] -0.455 [-1.27] 
Acc/A  -0.011 [-0.12] -0.153 [-1.07] -0.032 [-0.22] -0.122 [-0.83]  0.006 [0.06] -0.049 [-0.62] -0.078 [-0.51] -0.026 [-0.35] 
                             
S i z e   a n d   R i s k :                              
ME -0.229  [-1.42]  0.058  [0.14]  -0.332  [-3.19] 0.063 [0.16]  -0.240  [-1.94] 0.357  [-0.73] -0.297 [-3.39] -0.295 [-0.49] 
P  -0.213 [-1.40] -0.154 [-0.39] -0.254 [-1.47] -0.272 [-0.57] -0.221 [-2.46] -0.497 [-1.15] -0.279 [-2.97] -1.157 [-2.39] 
Age  -0.152 [-1.07] -0.275 [-1.07] -0.136 [-0.93] -0.322 [-1.13] -0.167 [-1.09] -0.720 [-1.10] -0.150 [-0.92] -0.758 [-0.98] 
 -0.366 [-1.36]  0.553  [1.65] -0.465 [-1.48] 0.375 [1.12]  -0.281  [-1.02] 0.352 [0.84] -0.391  [-1.19] 0.099 [0.20] 
  -0.185 [-1.07]  0.471  [1.74] -0.189 [-1.12] 0.276 [1.12]  -0.059  [-0.38] 0.369 [0.63] -0.145 [-1.10] -0.267 [-0.41] 
SHUM -0.367  [-1.68]  0.334  [1.17]  -0.597  [-3.00] 0.259 [0.90]  -0.407  [-1.77] 0.480 [0.95] -0.627  [-3.20] 0.756 [1.18] 
Div  -1.685 [-1.33]  1.498  [0.79] -2.393 [-2.06]  0.328 [0.18] -1.383 [-1.14] -2.382 [-0.52] -2.217 [-2.32] -6.268 [-1.56] 
                             
P r o f i t a b i l i t y :                              






Table 11. The economic significance of characteristic timing for corporate issuance. Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman and Wermers (1997) 
type decomposition of the returns to portfolios that are long low net issuance stocks and short high net issuance stocks. The portfolios are 
long stocks in the lowest NYSE net issuance decile and short stocks in the highest net issuance decile. Each stock in the portfolio is 
matched to one of 25 benchmark portfolios based on size and book-to-market. These benchmark portfolios are constructed using only the 
subset of seasoned firms that did not issue or repurchase stock in the prior fiscal year. The characteristic selectivity (CS) return is the 
difference between the portfolio return and the weighted return on the matched benchmarks portfolios. The average style (AS) return is 
the return on a benchmark portfolio that reflects the average size and B/M composition of the net issuance portfolio. The characteristic 
timing (CT) return captures deviations of the current size and B/M composition of the portfolio from its long-run average. The table 
shows results for both value- and equal-weighted portfolios based on net issuance, for both the full sample and the 1973-2007 sub-period. 
In each panel, the right-most column shows the fraction of the total return to the long-short net issuance portfolio that is due to 
characteristic timing. 
 
  1963-2007    1973-2007 
  % per annum    % per annum   
  R  =     CS  +     AS  +    CT  CT/R  R  =     CS  +     AS  +    CT  CT/R 
VW  9.23 7.39  -0.08 1.92  0.208 9.05 7.26  -0.09 1.89  0.209 
  [4.42] [4.56] [0.30] [2.24]    [3.73] [3.78] [0.32] [2.04]   
        
EW  11.25 7.41 2.14 1.69  0.150    12.14 7.90 2.27 1.97  0.162 
  [5.67] [5.01] [4.12] [2.92]      [5.06] [4.42] [3.64] [3.13]   
        
 